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Transnational Socioeconomic Justice and the Right of Resistance  
The cosmopolitan literature on transnational socioeconomic justice has 
developed unevenly.  More often than not its focus has been on how the affluent 
can satisfy their duties to the impoverished. What has largely been neglected is 
the role that the impoverished can play in ensuring that the duties owed to them 
are satisfied. This, however, does not sit well with the liberal tradition that 
informs cosmopolitanism, where the right to resist tyranny, even with violence, 
has featured prominently. This paper aims to recover the debate surrounding the 
right of resistance within the context of the current controversy over 
transnational socioeconomic justice. To do so it will examine the work of Thomas 
Pogge, as he is one of the most influential institutional cosmopolitans. It will 
begin by briefly examining two theses in Pogge’s work: the first is the argument 
that the current network of transnational socioeconomic institutions violate the 
human rights of millions of the world’s poorest people; the second is the recent 
claim that under certain circumstances harming innocent persons can be 
justified. It will then be argued that if one holds these two theses to be true then, 
as a matter of logical inference, one is committed to a third: that resistance to the 
international system and its institutions, even when it harms innocent people, is 
justifiable. 
§ Thesis One 
 The first thesis claims that the transnational institutional system 
foreseeably and avoidably produces severe poverty.i Consequently, individuals 
who cooperate with this system are complicit in the violation of the human 
rights of millions of people by failing to satisfy their negative duty not to impose 
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an institutional order that denies individuals their human rights. The failure to 
satisfy this negative duty creates positive obligations to reform these institutions 
and compensate their victims.(Pogge, 2008, p. 26)   
The type of human rights violation characterised above is systemic rather 
than “interactional.” These violations are not the consequences of individual 
actions but of the design of social institutions. This distinction is important 
because of how it assigns responsibility. Under the institutional understanding, 
human rights responsibilities are assigned to social institutions. Individual 
persons only have indirect and shared responsibility for the justice of the 
institutional system with which one cooperates.(Pogge, 2008, p. 176) Thus one 
does not need to be personally engaged in violating human rights to bear 
responsibility; all that is required is that one cooperates with institutions that 
perpetuate systemic injustices.  
 Additionally, the magnitude of this failure should be examined. Given that 
it constitutes a violation of human rights it is obviously non-trivial. However, in 
his most recent book Pogge has made explicit comparisons between the 
international system and the Holocaust. Those officials in charge of setting and 
revising the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals are compared with 
the Nazi officials at the Wannsee Conference who systemically planned the 
extermination of Europe’s Jews. Presumably it can then be inferred that the 
individuals who cooperate with the international system are comparable to 
those Germans who cooperated with Hitler’s tyranny, either passively or 
actively. It is not a perfect comparison given that the architects and supporters of 
the international system do not possess the malevolent intent of orchestrators of 
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the Holocaust. Yet, while intention does help to deflect some responsibility, it 
provides little comfort to the millions suffering and dying needlessly. (Pogge, 
2010, pp. 1-4) The scale of harm facilitated by the international system greatly 
overshadows the Holocaust in terms of lives lost; indeed it overshadows the 
death caused by the Second World War as a whole. (Pogge, 2007, p. 30) As such, 
the international system, insofar as it allows these foreseeable and avoidable 
deaths to continue, perpetuates perhaps the greatest violation of human rights in 
history.  
 This thesis on global poverty is controversial and has been subjected to 
criticism from many quarters.ii However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
assess its validity and it will be assumed to be true. This is acceptable given that 
the purpose of this paper is to examine the consequences of affirming the theses 
set out in the first two sections. Thus the aim of this section is modest. It has 
merely set out the basic structure of Pogge’s argument: the international system 
violates the basic human rights of millions by preventing them from having the 
objects of their rights. At least some responsibility falls on individuals who 
cooperate with the social institutions that violate human rights. These violations 
are far from trivial. Therefore, individuals who uncritically cooperate with the 
international system bear similar responsibility as those Germans who passively 
or actively cooperated with the Nazi regime.  
§ Thesis Two 
 The second thesis claims that violence against innocent persons can be 
justified when certain conditions are met.  The uncontroversial starting point is 
that causing harm to innocent persons is presumptively wrong. Here innocence 
 4 
is defined by two characteristics: the persons have done nothing to justify being 
harmed and they pose no threat to those carrying out an attack. However, 
harming innocents is only presumptively wrong; in certain situations this 
presumption can be overridden. There are two paths available to do this. The 
first involves ex-ante reasons, where the individuals harmed stood to gain. Such 
is the case when vaccinating someone against a pervasive illness even though 
there is a slim chance that they might be seriously harmed or even die from an 
allergic reaction. However, those harmed by acts of terror and war cannot be 
said to stand to benefit from such actions and this line of argument can be 
dismissed. (Pogge, 2010, p. 142)  
The second path is a consequentialist appeal to the “greater good” that 
rests on four conditions being satisfied. The first is that the greater good that is 
being appealed to is indeed a good. Second, that the act would, at least 
probabilistically, contribute to obtaining this good, Third, the good being 
appealed to sufficiently outweighs the harm caused to innocent persons. Finally, 
the act is necessary for the good to be achieved. (Pogge, 2010, pp. 142-143)  
These conditions are used to show that recent Islamist terror attacks, 
such as the ones of September 11, 2001, were unjustified. The goods appealed to 
by those carrying out these attacks were discouraging Western intervention in 
the Muslim world, weakening support for Israel, and punishing the West for past 
transgressions.(Pogge, 2010, p. 143) All of these goods are controversial and 
objectionable on the grounds that they do not meet the first and third conditions. 
Secondly, it is not evident that these attacks could have reasonably contributed 
to the aforementioned goods, given that these attacks rather predictably 
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increased Western intervention in the Muslim world and sympathy for Israel; 
thus being objectionable on the second condition. Finally, these attacks 
egregiously harmed more innocent persons than were necessary to achieve their 
aims. The September 11, 2001 attacks, for example, could have occurred on a 
Sunday morning minimising the harm to innocent persons. Therefore, the fourth 
condition is not met. (Pogge, 2010, pp. 141-147) As such, the Islamist terror 
attacks that have occurred over the past decade were unjustified, but this is not 
to claim that all actions that harm innocent persons are unjustifiable.  
§ Thesis Three  
 The preceding sections have been descriptive. They have provided an 
overview of two theses of Thomas Pogge regarding the causes of global poverty 
and when it is justifiable to harm innocent persons. This section will change the 
tenor of the paper by asking whether holding these two theses to be true 
commits one to holding a third thesis: that it is legitimate to resist a global 
system that violates basic human rights, even if these acts of resistance harm the 
innocent. 
 The first question that needs to be answered is whether individuals who 
cooperate with the international system can be considered innocent. It is evident 
that Pogge considers those who cooperate with the international system, even 
through passive acquiescence, as being indirectly responsible for the human 
rights violations caused by it. So the question must be does responsibility negate 
Pogge’s understanding of innocence? Pogge’s first criterion for innocence is that 
the persons in question pose no threat to those who would carry out the attacks. 
In an immediate sense this is obtainable. The majority of people who are 
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empowered by and cooperate with the international system do not actively seek 
to cause grievous harm. They do not, generally, participate in interactional harms 
in the same way as a torturer or murderer. Yet, the systemic understanding of 
the rights violation allows for an interpretation that those who cooperate with 
the international system do pose a threat to the world’s poor by cooperating 
with the system that finances tyrants, penalises emerging democracies, and 
encourages their overthrow. In an indirect way, the citizens of powerful states 
pose a real threat to the fundamental rights of many people.  
This also helps to answer the second criterion; that innocent persons have 
done nothing to justify acts of violence against them. It is possible to conceive 
that the distribution of power in the international system could be asymmetrical 
thus making the powerful a threat to the weak, but ultimately if this power is not 
used then it would fail to meet this second condition. However, the central claim 
of the first thesis is that the international system does in fact harm millions of 
people. Consequently, those who cooperate with the international system cannot 
readily be considered innocent.  
One might dispute Pogge’s criterion of innocence and ask if merely 
cooperating with the international system in the way that an ordinary citizen 
does is enough to make them responsible for harm caused by this system. A 
person could, for example, be forced to cooperate at gunpoint with a gang of 
thugs in some harmful criminal enterprise, but it would be unreasonable to say 
that this person is therefore responsible for the harm caused by the crime. Is the 
average citizen of a developed state a similarly coerced but unwilling 
accomplice? There are two replies that could be tentatively offered to this 
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argument. The first is that of democratic responsibility. The majority of the 
world’s affluent citizens live in states that have democratic constitutions. The 
fact that these states are controlled by their citizenry and speak in the name of 
these citizens is enough to extend responsibility for the transnational institutions 
supported by their states. The band of criminals, presumably, do not ask for the 
consent of their cat’s paw, nor do they act in the name of the coerced. Thus when 
democratic states foreseeably and avoidably create transnational social 
institutions that harm millions the responsibility must also fall on all citizens, not 
just the powerful and influential.  
The second response is to look at who benefits from the harmful act. The 
coerced accomplice does not stand to gain from the criminal enterprise (apart 
from not suffering the harm threatened by non-compliance). The citizens of 
those states that shape the transnational system do appear to profit through the 
availability of cheap products manufactured in developing countries, through the 
jobs created by the extraction of cheap minerals, by permitting powerful states 
to subsidise farmers and so on. In benefitting from the fruits of exploitation and 
authorising their states to support a transnational system that forseeably and 
avoidably causes harm the average citizen possesses dirty hands. Yet, even if we 
were to accept that the average citizen of a developed state is innocent, the 
overall argument pursued in this section is not compromised. If they are not 
responsible for the transnational system it only makes the question of whether it 
is acceptable to harm the innocent more pressing.  
 Setting aside the question of whether the average citizen is responsible 
for the violation of human rights caused by transnational social institutions, 
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there is a less contentious way to identify innocent persons. All that is required 
for a person to trivially satisfy their negative duty to not cooperate with an 
unjust transnational system is to abstain from this system, as would be the case 
of a hermit. In the non-trivial way innocence requires that when one is enmeshed 
within an unjust system he or she dedicate reasonable effort towards reforming 
the system and compensating its victims. (Pogge, 2007, pp. 25-26) Moreover, 
there may be persons who could be intrinsically free from responsibility for the 
system from which they have benefitted, children being the most prominent 
example. It is, therefore, possible to conceive that there are people who could 
meet Pogge’s understanding of innocence that could be harmed by acts of 
resistance. 
 Thus the question now turns on whether acts of violence against the 
international system can satisfy the four criteria listed in the second thesis.  The 
first condition is that the good being contributed to actually be a good. This is the 
least controversial condition since, under Pogge’s framework, human rights have 
a correlated negative duty not to impose a system of institutions that deny 
persons the objects of these rights. 
The second condition that the action will at least probabilistically 
contribute to the realisation of the good is more complicated and Pogge does not 
provide detail into what he means by this. In his test case he claims that the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were unjustifiable, in part, because they 
were counterproductive. This condition hinges on how probability is understood 
and what is a sufficient level of probability to merit a particular act. In certain 
circumstances a relatively low probability of success could still merit some forms 
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of violent resistance. The history of slave rebellion provides a way to illuminate 
this; the Helot rebellions against the Spartans, the Servile Wars in the Roman 
Republic, and the various slave revolts in the Americas had relatively little 
chance of succeeding and when they failed the consequences were often dire for 
the participants. However, there is a plausible argument that when the wrong 
being endured is sufficiently severe then a low probability of success suffices to 
justify resistance. In the cases of rebellions against slavery it is intuitively 
plausible that resistance is justifiable even if the odds of success are relatively 
low. It would similarly be difficult to criticise resistance against a genocidal 
regime or even an intransigent imperial occupation, even if success was only a 
distant hope.  
It might be objected that the comparison to slavery is inaccurate given 
that slaves had identifiable targets such as their masters, whereas the 
transnational system is more diffuse. However, this mistakes slavery as being a 
merely personal relationship between master and slave, rather than a social 
institution supported by the cooperation of a multitude of individuals who may 
not own slaves. The slaves may have had some clearer sense of who was 
immediately responsible for their oppression, but this does not invalidate the 
comparison of systemically oppressed groups. In the case of the international 
system, if thesis one is accepted, then the situation of the world’s poor is 
comparable to that of slaves and appears to legitimatise resistance, however 
slight the probability of producing an effective outcome. 
The third condition, that the good achieved by an act outweigh the harm 
caused by the act, is easier to meet. The claim of thesis one is that the 
 10 
international system, as it currently stands, contributes to the premature deaths 
of some 50,000 people per day or, in more vivid terms, the death toll of 
September 11, 2001 is repeated once every hour and a half. Thus if we are to 
weigh harming the innocent against benefit to the global poor, we should also 
consider that the status quo is not neutral but harms a multitude of innocent 
people. This is a devastating moral tragedy. If an act of resistance, though it 
grievously harms innocent persons, could potentially help change the structure 
of the international system then it seems very difficult to argue that it is not 
justified on the basis of comparing harms. 
The final condition, that the act be necessary to achieve the goal, is 
perhaps the most difficult to meet. As mentioned previously, Pogge condemns 
the destruction of the World Trade Centre because of the unnecessary harm 
done to innocent persons. The claim that the wanton taking of innocent life is 
wrong is indisputable, but it does not equate to a blanket prohibition on acts of 
violence. It perhaps only requires that those employing such methods take due 
diligence in ensuring that the number of innocent persons harmed is minimised, 
such as by issuing bomb threats as was the custom of the IRA. (Pogge, 2010, pp. 
141-142) This raises difficult questions regarding necessity and whether 
violence ever is necessary. A strict condition of necessity, literally meaning a 
condition without which an object could not be achieved provides an ex post way 
of judging actions. It could be said that the violence done to innocent persons in 
the American Revolution was justified since it was necessary to produce an 
independent republic, but that the Revolutions of 1848 in Europe were 
unnecessary because they didn’t achieve their ends and prompted conservative 
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reaction. However, we should be careful not to conflate necessity and sufficiency. 
It may be that an act of violent resistance as in 1848 was necessary to achieve 
the ends of a Europe of democratic nation states, but that it was insufficient to 
achieve that end alone.  
In the case of transnational justice there seems to be a strong argument 
for the necessity of violence. The depth of the problem of global poverty has been 
repeatedly emphasised in this paper this can be complimented by examining its 
intransigence. The problem of severe global poverty has been a subject of 
academic debate for almost four decades. Yet, according to Pogge, little practical 
progress has been made. Indeed, one of his central claims is that progress has 
stalled and commitments to the global poor, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals, have been revised into meaninglessness. (Pogge, 2010, pp. 
57-75) Given the unwillingness of the citizens of the developed world and their 
representative states to reform the international system and the cost of this 
system to millions of people, it seems plausible to claim that violent resistance, 
even when it harms innocent people, is necessary (though perhaps insufficient) 
to achieve this aim. 
It can be concluded, at least according to the criterion of thesis two, that it 
is not necessarily wrong to harm innocent persons to rectify the injustice of the 
current international system, as described in thesis one. Setting aside the 
question of innocence, the four conditions listed in thesis two all appear to be 
met. The good of a just international system is uncontroversial. The probability 
of such acts contributing to this good is acceptable even if it is low. The harm 
caused by the international system to innocent persons outweighs all but the 
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most atrocious actions against innocent persons. Finally, regarding the necessity 
of such actions, one can only point out that despite the energetic work of many 
people and a widespread awareness of the disparity between the world’s 
wealthiest and the world’s poorest there has been little change in the status of 
the latter. As such, it seems plausible to argue that, where peaceful politics has 
failed so badly, recourse to extreme measures is justifiable. 
§ Harming Innocents and the Right of Resistance  
If the above argument is correct and there is a right to resist unjust 
transnational institutions this raises many questions about the implication of 
this right. The connection between acts of resistance and violence has been 
stressed, but it is not evident that the right of resistance needs to be exercised 
violently. However, it is necessary not to equate non-violence with non-harm. It 
is perfectly conceivable that a non-violent action such as a general strike could 
seriously harm innocent persons by, for example, preventing the delivery of vital 
medicine or causing businesses to collapse, immiserating those dependent upon 
it for work. Alternatively, a violent act may harm no innocent person such as the 
act of tyrannicide, though the diffuse nature of transnational social institutions 
does not provide an obvious equivalent to the classic tyrant.   
The aim of resistance is also of interest. One could point to revolutionary 
movements such as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation as an example of a 
secessionist movement from the current transnational system in their attempts 
to form a local socialist economy on the basis of a right of resistance. Yet, a right 
to resistance does not necessarily equate with a return to parochialism but might 
aim for a more egalitarian arrangement of transnational institutions.  
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Finally, we may ask about the role of third parties. It is plausible that 
those who suffer the most harm from the transnational system are unable to 
resist. Does this mean that there is a duty to intervene on their behalf that could 
be executed by those who do not suffer the negative effects of the transnational 
system? On one hand this may be appealing considering that sympathetic 
persons in the developed world might be able to exert more influence by acting 
out of solidarity, but it also might invite the type of unhelpful adventurism that 
informed the Baader-Meinhof Group. These questions cannot be definitively 
answered here, but they bring to light the debate that needs to occur if it is 
plausible that there is a cosmopolitan right to resistance.  
§  Conclusion 
 The purpose of this paper is not to endorse political violence in the cause 
of transnational socioeconomic justice. It has simply argued that if one holds the 
first two theses to be true then one must also endorse a third. It is possible that 
by revising or abandoning either of the first two theses one need not hold the 
third. Nevertheless, if the international institutional system produces massive 
systemic harm to millions of people and if it is legitimate for individuals to resist 
social institutions that inflict a “long train of abuses” upon them, then it is 
necessary to take a cosmopolitan right to resistance seriously. Given the 
intransigence of the international system to reform in the face of an unspeakable 
human tragedy, it is time to ask whether the right to resistance that was once 
located within the state has a cosmopolitan scope and what the implications of 





                                                        
i The current international system fails to provide access to the objects of human rights for 
historical and ongoing reasons. The first case illuminates the historical complicity of the 
international system with imperialism, colonisation, and so on. However, even without these 
historic wrongs, the current international system supports ongoing violations of human rights. 
Pogge identifies two “privileges” that the international system grants to the leaders of states that 
contribute to depriving people of the objects of their human rights. They are given power to 
effect legally valid transfers of ownership over the resources within their state and they are given 
the power to borrow money from international institutions. The resource privilege and the 
borrowing privilege constitute violations of the human right to basic necessities because they 
provide legal means for tyrants to consolidate their power, in cases where authoritarian 
governments are overthrown the new governments are saddled with debts and obligations that 
often unmanageable, and finally access to this these powers provides a strong incentive for 
powerful cliques to overthrow democratic governments.  
(Pogge, 2008, p. esp. ch.4, 2010, p. esp. ch.2) 
ii Cosmopolitans, such as Simon Caney, have taken exception to Pogge’s thesis by claiming that 
the existence of international institutions is not morally relevant. The worry expressed is that 
individuals who are outside of the transnational system could be left in circumstances of extreme 
poverty with no recourse to justice.(Caney, 2005, pp. 104-116) Non-cosmopolitan critics, such as 
Mathias Risse, have disputed the empirical claim that transnational institutions harm the global 
poor. Instead they claim that these systems have had a positive effect on the conditions of the 
global poor.(Risse, 2005) Others have argued that duties of justice do not obtain at the global 
level for various reasons. Christian Barry and Laura Valentini have provided an excellent 
overview of liberal egalitarian critiques of cosmopolitanism.(Barry & Valentini, 2009) 
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